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Human rights abuses targeted towards LGBT persons constitute a global pattern of 
serious concern. Despite the fact that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity is prohibited by various international, regional and national legal provisions, prejudices 
and stereotypes related to LGBT people significantly impede the implementation of non-
discrimination laws. This study focuses on contemporary Serbia, and attempts to understand the 
role of public discourse in inciting and perpetuating homophobia. The aim of the study is to 
analyse whether and how Serbian nationalist myths influence homophobia, as well as to 
determine which elements of the Serbian public discourse represent hate speech targeted towards 
sexual minorities. This study uses discourse analysis as the main methodological and analytical 
tool, and focuses primarily on the discourses that emerged around three main events: the 
adoption of the first comprehensive anti-discrimination law in March 2009, the cancellation of 
the Belgrade Pride in September 2009, and the Pride parade held in Belgrade in October 2010. 
The study concludes that the Serbian public discourse – namely, the discourse of the Serbian 
politicians, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the mainstream media – is still deeply imbued with 
nationalist myths and stereotypes from the past, which contribute greatly to the perception of 
sexual minorities as the enemies of the nation and the society. The study also assesses that hate 
messages against LGBT people are frequent and widespread in Serbian society, and that the hate 
speech laws are not adequately implemented.  
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Introduction   
 
 
It took some time and lot of money, 
Newspapers, TV channels and a plug. 
Some thought it was funny 
Others were proud as they stepped in line. 
 
All the daddy’s little boys 
Getting ready for the Enemy. 
 
It’s not so hard to understand it 
If you could read between the lines, 
Cause it’s always embedded 
In a colorful media lie.  
 
Red Union (punk-rock band from Serbia), ‘Inbred Nation’ 
 
 
1.1. Introduction to the Case 
 
In June 2001, almost a year after the downfall of Slobodan Milošević’s authoritarian 
regime, Serbia’s first ever Pride Parade was abandoned half-way through due to the violent 
attacks by the members of the Serbian ultranationalist and pro-fascist groups. Eight years later, in 
March 2009, the Serbian Parliament adopted the first comprehensive anti-discrimination law 
prohibiting discrimination on a number of grounds, including sexual orientation. Encouraged by 
the adoption of this law, the Serbian LGBT community announced their plans to organise the 
second Pride Parade on 20 September 2009 in the Serbia’s capital Belgrade. However, the Pride 
organisers were met with strong opposition, not only from the far-right groups, but also from 
some political parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church. After the months of a continuous anti-
Pride campaign, the Parade was finally called off due to lack of security assurances. The police 
announced that they could not guarantee the safety of the marchers and urged the organisers to 
change venues from the main Belgrade streets to another location. The organisers found that 
proposal unacceptable. The cancellation, or rather banning (Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights in Serbia, 2010: 276), of the 2009 Pride Parade was strongly criticised by both the 
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domestic human rights NGOs and the international community; it became evident that Serbia 
will not be able to make any further progress in its European integration without substantial 
changes in the LGBT rights policy. Thus, when the LGBT activists announced a new attempt to 
hold the Parade in October 2010, the Serbian political elite showed a considerably changed 
attitude towards the LGBT issues, and much stronger commitment to securing the Pride. The 
Pride Parade was finally held, on 10 October 2010. However, during the Parade, thousands of 
police officers sealed off the Pride venues, repeatedly clashing with the far-right extremists who 
tried to burst through the security cordons, while chanting ‘Death to fags!’ (Guardian, 2010). 
Although the Serbian police managed to protect the Pride participants from the extremists’ 
attacks, the battle between the police and the right-wing groups, in which dozens were injured, 
indicates how deeply ingrained homophobia is in the Serbian society.  
 
1.2. Problem Statement and Research Aims 
 
Serbia is a party to the various international conventions prohibiting discrimination 
against minorities. Although an international treaty particularly concerned with the 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation does not exist, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee affirmed in its decision in Toonen v. Australia that sexual orientation and 
gender identity are included as grounds of discrimination under Articles 2 and 26 of ICCPR (UN 
Human Rights Committee, 1994). However, in contemporary Serbia, discrimination and violence 
against LGBT people still represent a serious problem. This consequently opens the question 
about the relationship between homophobia and the general political culture, largely dominated 
by nationalist ideas. The way in which sexual minorities are portrayed and referred to in the 
Serbian public discourse reflects a lack of understanding of the basic principles of human rights, 
and perpetuates the marginalisation and discrimination of LGBT persons – homosexual conduct 
is depicted as a serious illness, commonly compared to paedophilia, and often described as 
utterly incompatible with the Serbian national and religious identity. In such a socio-political 
environment, the LGBT minority experiences continuous threats and attacks by the 
ultranationalist and pro-fascist groups, some of which enjoy the support – explicit or implicit – of 




This study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
 
• To examine the correlation between right-wing and homophobic attitudes. 
 
• To analyse the portrayal of the LGBT minority in the Serbian public discourse, and to 
determine whether and how Serbian nationalist myths and stereotypes influence 
homophobia. 
 
• To identify which elements of the Serbian public discourse constitute hate speech. 
 
1.3. Importance of the Study and Delimitations 
 
This research examines the root causes of the homophobic attitudes in Serbian society. 
The ultimate aim of the study is to assess the responsibility of different socio-political actors for 
the violations of LGBT rights, and to determine how the issues of homophobia and homophobic 
hate speech should be addressed. The argument that I will seek to develop is that homophobia in 
Serbia is not an apolitical phenomenon, ideologically neutral, and independent from power 
relations, but a phenomenon that is indeed a part of general political culture, strongly influenced 
by the dominant ideologies. In that way, I will strive to establish the connection between 
homophobia and Serbian nationalism. Further, by using critical discourse analysis as the main 
methodological and analytical tool, I will attach particular importance to the language of 
powerful actors, and the ways in which language is used to legitimise discrimination against 
LGBT people. 
 
Homophobia is an extremely complex phenomenon, and its causes could not be reduced 
to a single one. However – as it is understandable from the aims of the research – in this study I 
am focusing on right-wing concepts and ideas, as one of the causes of homophobic attitudes, 
without claiming that homophobia could not be induced by other causes. Further, this thesis does 
not cover and analyse homophobic violence, as an issue per se, but rather focuses on the anti-gay 
rhetoric that precedes it, as well as on the processes of creating and strengthening prejudices 
through discursive actions. Lastly, this study does not include a discussion on the discourse of 
the Serbian far-right groups. Although the Government of Serbia has so far failed to show 
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sufficient genuine will in dealing with the far-right organisations, it is clear that the rhetoric of 
these explicitly incites violence and, as such, exemplifies hate speech. Acknowledging that the 
discourse of the Serbian extremist organisations is an issue that could be examined from various 
perspectives, I decided to limit my research to the analysis of the mainstream discourses – 
namely: the discourse of the political elite, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and some media – in 
order to demonstrate that homophobia is not a characteristic of the far-right alone, but also 
permeates the voices that represent majority in the Serbian society.  
 
1.4. Some Terms Frequently Used 
 
LGBT: The abbreviation that refers collectively to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
people. Acknowledging that the term LGBT encompasses a variety of identities that could not be 
reduced to a single one, I will use this abbreviation – interchangeably with the term sexual 
minorities – in order to refer to anyone who is non-heterosexual. 
 
Pride Parade (Pride March): The event that agitates for LGBT rights and/or celebrates 
the LGBT culture. In countries with long histories of LGBT movements and high levels of gay 
rights protection, Pride Parades usually have a festive character – as the mere word ‘Parade’ 
suggests. On the other hand, in the socio-political settings that are hostile to sexual minorities, 
Pride Parades generally take the form of political protests. There is no doubt that in Serbian 
context, Gay Prides are conceptualised as demonstrations against discrimination. Nevertheless, 
in this thesis I will use the term ‘Parade’, since it is more commonly used, both within the 
discourses that I am focusing on, and in the discourse of the Serbian Pride organisers.  
 
Homophobia: George Weinberg, the American psychologist who coined the term 
‘homophobia’ defined it as ‘the dread of being in close quarters with homosexuals’ (cited in 
Fone, 2000: 5). Although this definition, as well as the suffix ‘phobia’, suggests the irrational 
nature of the fear at stake, in this thesis I will not approach homophobia as an irrational fear, but 
primarily as a socially constructed set of prejudices against LGBT people. As Young-Bruehl 
(Ibid) argues, prejudices could be obsessional, hysterical and narcissistic. Obsessional prejudices 
are characterised by the belief that the hated individuals are enemies and conspirators, hysterical 
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prejudices see their objects as inferior and sexually threatening, while those who suffer from 
narcissistic prejudice simply cannot accept that people who are not like them exist (Ibid). My 
intention here is to analyse homophobia as a combination of all three types of prejudices. In the 
context of this study, transphobia will be included under the term ‘homophobia’. 
 
Right-Wing (ideologies, ideas, politics, groups, etc.): Even though the term ‘right-wing’ 
includes a wide range of ideologies, movements and political platforms that significantly differ 
from each other, in this thesis I will focus primarily on their common characteristic, that is, non-
egalitarianism and the idea of superiority of certain groups over the others (See, for example: 
Bobbio and Cameron, 1997; Mosse, 1999). As my intention is not to explore the difference 
between various right-wing ideologies, I will use this term to refer to any ideology, group, policy 
or discursive practice that contradicts the concept of the equality of all human beings in the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although certain left-wing 
movements – particularly movements for self-determination – could be described as nationalist, 
this study will approach nationalism as primarily a right-wing ideology that is based on the idea 
of superiority of certain nations to all other. 
 
1.5. Chapters Overview 
 
This thesis is organised in six chapters. While the first chapter provides an introduction to 
the study, the second chapter is concerned with the theoretical framework used for the analysis of 
the case of Serbia. Chapter three describes the Serbian socio-political context in relation to the 
theoretical concepts analysed in the previous chapter. Chapter four introduces the 
methodological approach that I used for the analysis of the Serbian public discourse in chapter 
five. Finally, the last chapter summarises the arguments made, providing the conclusion and 

































Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the concepts and theoretical positions that served as 
a general framework for my analysis of the case of Serbia. Although these concepts might appear 
as not immediately related to each other, taken together they enabled me to grasp the complexity 
of the human rights issues that I am focusing on in my thesis. The chapter starts with an 
overview of the international jurisprudence related to LGBT rights, particularly the right to 
equality and non-discrimination, continues with the analysis of the masculine stereotype and the 
notion of ‘normality’ v. ‘abnormality’, and ends with a discussion about hate speech as a 
limitation on freedom of expression. 
 
 
2.1.  International Legal Framework for LGBT Rights: Right to 
Equality and Non-Discrimination  
 
Generally speaking, the rights of LGBT people could be defended from two distinct 
positions, that is, with two different, although not mutually exclusive, sets of arguments. The 
first position is based on the right to privacy, guaranteed by Article 17 of the ICCPR. In 
accordance with this viewpoint, adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the 
concept of privacy and, consequently, criminalisation or any other prohibition of private 
homosexual conduct represents an infringement of the individual’s right to privacy. The second 
position is grounded in the right to equality and non-discrimination, and, as such, reflects the 
principle that all human beings are entitled to equal protection of human rights regardless of, 
inter alia, their sexual orientation. While acknowledging that the privacy argument has been of a 
great importance for claiming and advancing LGBT rights, in this thesis I will primarily focus on 
the right to equality as it is, in my opinion, the stronger argument, and also the one reflecting 




Article 1 of the UDHR establishes that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights’ (UN, 1948). As Smith (2007) argues, this basic premise highlights the 
conceptual universality of human rights and, consequently, entails the prohibition of 
discrimination in the enjoyment of those rights as an integral part of the notion of universality. 
Virtually every human rights treaty includes a non-discrimination clause (Ibid). For example, 
Article 2(1) [non-discrimination] and Article 26 [equal protection of the law] of the ICCPR 
require state parties to ensure equal enjoyment of human rights for all the people regardless of 
their ‘[r]ace, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status’ (UN, 1966). The right to non-discrimination is also enshrined in 
Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 2 of 
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as in the provisions of regional 
human rights instruments such as the European Convention of Human Rights (Article 14), 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Article 2) etc. 
 
Although sexual orientation or gender identity are not explicitly mentioned as prohibited 
grounds of discrimination in any of these legal provisions, current interpretations by the UN 
bodies and by international human rights experts are in consensus on the need to interpret the 
abovementioned provisions as including sexual orientation and gender identity. In the landmark 
decision in Toonen v. Australia, the UN Human Rights Committee (1994) – the treaty body 
which has the authority to interpret the ICCPR – affirmed that sexual orientation was implicated 
by the treaty’s antidiscrimination provisions as a protected status. Furthermore, the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has, through its general comments and its 
concluding observations, expressed concern over discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and, even more importantly, it has provided an authoritative interpretation of the 
article 2(2) of the ICESCR in the General Comment No. 20 which sets out: 
 
‘Other status’ as recognized in article 2(2) includes sexual orientation. States parties should 
ensure that a person’s sexual orientation is not a barrier to realising Covenant rights, for 
example, in accessing survivor’s pension rights. In addition, gender identity is recognized 
as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination; for example, persons who are 
transgender, transsexual or intersex often face serious human rights violations, such as 




As with the ICCPR and ICESCR, General Comment No. 4 of the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (2003: §6) has asserted that Article 2 of the CRC covers adolescents’ sexual 
orientation and health status, while the UN Committee against Torture (2008: §21) has also 
expressed its opinion that the laws and policies in relation to fulfilling obligations under the UN 
Convention against Torture must be ‘[a]pplied to all persons, regardless of […] sexual 
orientation, transgender identity […]’. 
 
However, despite the interpretations of the UN treaty bodies, as well as the continuous 
efforts of local and international NGOs that seek to promote the rights of LGBT people, a 
number of states still do not acknowledge sexual orientation as a human rights issue, or even as a 
matter of concern (O’Flaherty and Fisher, 2008). Consequently, sexual minorities worldwide are 
subject to persistent human rights violations ranging from verbal harassment to torture and 
extrajudicial killings. In response to the widespread human rights violations targeted towards the 
LGBT minority, and in order to overcome the inconsistency in both legal and policy approaches, 
human rights experts from twenty-five countries were invited in 2006 to draft the Yogyakarta 
Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity (Ibid). The Yogyakarta Principles comprise a broad range of 
human rights standards and elaborate on their application in relation to LGBT persons. Although 
the Principles as such are not legally binding, they reflect the provisions of international treaties 
and, in that way, affirm and strengthen the already existing obligation of states to protect human 
rights (Ibid). 
 
It is also important to point to several landmark cases in which courts have relied on 
equality and non-discrimination provisions in deciding cases related to sexual orientation and 
gender identity. Alongside the abovementioned case of Toonen v. Australia, the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Egan v. Canada (1995) unanimously held that sexual orientation was a prohibited 
ground of discrimination (Petrova, in press). In the later case of Vriend v. Alberta (1998) the 
Canadian court reaffirmed that position, invoking the continuous marginalisation of LGBT 
persons as a justification for its decision (Ibid). Further, by drawing parallels between sodomy 
laws and apartheid legislation, the South African Constitutional Court in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice (1998) has pointed out that it is the explicit 
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purpose of the right to equality and the right to dignity to end marginalisation of vulnerable 
groups, inter alia sexual minorities (Ibid). Finally, in a very recent court case, the High Court of 
England and Wales upheld the bar on a Christian couple to become foster parents, because of 
their view that homosexuality is morally wrong (BBC, 2011). The Court ruled that laws 
protecting people from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation should take 
precedence over the right not to be discriminated against on religious grounds (Ibid). Explaining 
their decision in this case, Justice Munby and Justice Beatson noted that the judgment did not 
seek to de-legitimise Christianity or any other belief, but, on the contrary, to confirm the 
fundamental principle that every human being is equal before the law and entitled to dignity and 
respect (Bates, 2011).  
 
2.2.  Modern Masculinity and the Distinction between ‘Normal’ and 
‘Abnormal’ 
 
Masculine Stereotype and the Creation of the Countertype  
 
To be able to comprehend the origins and the nature of prejudices against sexual 
minorities in Serbia, I consider it necessary to discuss the links between nationalist ideas – that 
still dominate a large part of Serbian society as well as the public discourse, and the ideas about 
sexuality. In this regard, I will draw upon the work of George Mosse, a social historian who has 
made a significant contribution to the study of right-wing ideologies and their attitudes towards 
sexuality. Although Mosse focuses primarily on German, and to some extent on English and 
French societies, it is indisputable that there are certain features inherent to all right-wing ideas 
regardless of the historical and societal context that they are developing in (See, for example: 
Eco, 2004). Acknowledging the fact that Mosse’s theory of fascism could be and has been 
criticised and disputed, I, nevertheless, choose to devote considerable space to this author as he 
in his works pays particular attention to homophobia (although he himself does not use this term) 
and its place and role in right-wing ideologies. Furthermore, instead of focusing on one particular 
right-wing ideology, it appears that Mosse draws upon their common characteristics, more 
specifically - the idea of exclusiveness and superiority of certain groups over the others (Mosse, 
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1999), and builds his argument on the basis of this feature. In my study, I will follow his 
approach.  
 
Mosse starts his book ‘Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual 
Norms in Modern Europe’ (1985) by examining the relationship between nationalism and 
respectability – two, in his view, mutually supportive concepts that emerged with modernity and 
eventually spread throughout Europe. In Mosse’s analysis, the notion of bourgeois respectability 
signifies a set of norms, manners, morals and attitudes that served as the criteria for defining 
normality. A sharp distinction between normality and abnormality was one of the core features 
of modern respectability, and nationalism played an important role in strengthening this 
dichotomy and spreading it to all classes of the society. As Mosse points out, nationalists 
believed that the line between normal and abnormal had to be preserved if the nation was to be 
protected against its enemies. ‘Nationalism and respectability assigned everyone his place in life, 
man and women, normal and abnormal, native and foreigner; any confusion between these 
categories threatened chaos and loss of control’ (Mosse, 1985: 16). However, Mosse argues that 
there is no universal law according to which normal and abnormal could be defined; in other 
words, he claims that the notion of normality and normal behaviour, sexual or otherwise, is 
historically determined, i.e. a product of particular historical circumstances. 
 
Further, Mosse (1985) discusses the role of the ideal of manliness in preserving a clear 
distinction between normality and abnormality. He argues that manliness – although built upon 
the medieval notions of chivalry and aristocratic honour – was indeed a bourgeois concept, vital 
both for self-definition of bourgeois society and for the ideology of nationalism. Manliness 
reinforced the division of labour, not only in economics but also in social and sexual life (Mosse, 
1985: 24), and served nationalism as a powerful symbol and stereotype (Ibid, p. 31). Modernity, 
on the other hand, was perceived as threatening to the social order of bourgeois society. It was 
closely associated with ‘degeneration’, as the antithesis of normality. And homosexuality – 
together with other sexual practices that were believed to be deviant (e.g. masturbation) – was a 




In the book ‘The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity’, Mosse (1996) 
discusses the creation and evolution of the masculine stereotype from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century onwards, and analyses the role of this stereotype in the political movements 
and ideologies of nationalism and fascism. In his view, the modern masculinity has been rooted 
in several premises that corresponded with the ideas of right-wing movements, and efficiently 
served their ends. First, the masculine stereotype established physical beauty as a reflection of 
moral strength and mental robustness. In other words, it suggested that there was a direct link 
between physical appearance and inner qualities of a person. Secondly, the new (i.e. modern) 
masculinity emphasized the sacrifice for a higher purpose as a defining feature of manliness. 
Although the ideal of manliness was not a characteristic of right-wing ideologies alone – as 
Mosse notes, socialists also co-opted the masculinity stereotype – it was nationalism that linked 
manliness and patriotism, and interpreted the sacrifice for the ‘higher purpose’ as the sacrifice 
for an entirely impersonal idea – the idea of nation.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the argument I am seeking to develop in my 
study, the masculine stereotype needed a countertype – an image against which it could define 
itself, and which represented the man who had failed to attain the qualities of manliness. Even 
though one could justifiably assume that the women as such – representing the very opposite of 
normative masculinity – were perceived to be the negative stereotype, it was not the case. As 
long as they stayed within the borders of their prescribed roles, women were not seen as the 
countertype (Mosse, 1996). However, if they dared to cross these borders, they joined 
countertypes and became the ‘enemies of society’ (Ibid, p. 12). ‘[J]ust as modern masculinity 
reflected the ideals and hopes of society, so its enemies were the enemies of society’ (Ibid). The 
list of those remaining outside the notion of true manliness, thus providing a countertype, was 
rather long and also heterogeneous; it included: Jews, Gypsies, vagrants, habitual criminals, 
insane, and homosexuals (Ibid). Outsiders were the ones who differed from the majority, either 
by their origin, religion or language, or simply because they failed to conform to social norms 
and, thus, were perceived as asocial (Ibid, p.56). As Mosse points out, in right-wing ideologies 
the outsiders were denied the possibility of having honour that was seen as inseparable from the 




[t]he difference could not be absolute. The ‘subhuman’ had to be concretized, to be made 
familiar if it was to pose believable threat. Jews and the other outsiders were stereotyped 
as evil kinds of men but nevertheless still recognizable as men even if they reversed 
traditional values. [Mosse, 1996: 63] 
 
Hence, in right-wing movements, those who failed to attain the qualities of manliness were not 
seen as deserving pity or compassion, but, on the contrary, they were regarded as the enemies of 
nation, and the ones representing an active threat to the normative order of the society. 
 
Other authors have also discussed the origins and the consequences of the belief that 
homosexuals were the enemies of the state. According to Micheler (2005), who analysed the 
homophobic propaganda under National Socialism, homosexuals in the Third Reich were seen as 
degenerate and ill, both morally and physically. As such, they could not be ‘assimilated into the 
Aryan German ideal’ (Ibid, p.96) and, consequently, they were regarded as a threat. This was due 
to two main reasons. First, homosexuals were unlikely to reproduce and, therefore, they were 
seen as violating their sacred duty. In other words, homosexuality was regarded as a pathological 
and entirely abnormal condition, as it was inconsistent with ‘the natural purpose of sexual 
intercourse’ (Ibid, p.100). Secondly, in the case homosexuals had offspring, they were believed 
to pass on ‘the degeneration’ to their sons (Ibid). Moreover, in Nazi German discourse 
homosexuality was described as an ‘epidemic’ (Ibid, p.96), and gay men were portrayed as 
‘corrupters’ and ‘seducers’ who ‘preferred boys and youth’ (Ibid, p.96, 103). Hence, 
homosexuality was established as both illness and criminal offence. Micheler, however, points 
out that publicly expressed attitudes towards homosexuals varied widely – from searching for the 
‘cure’ to the insistence of their physical extermination. 
 
Finally, both Micheler and Mosse indicate another feature that was ascribed to 
homosexuals by right-wing ideologies and propaganda; namely, homosexuals were often 
associated with conspiracies, subversive activities against the state, plots and treasons. As Mosse 
(1996) argues, conspiracy theories haunted not only homosexuals, but all ‘outsiders’. They were 
believed to collaborate among themselves in order to destroy the ‘healthy society’. Assumptions 
and claims about homosexual conspiracies fuelled the hostility against gay people and 




Discourse, Power and ‘Normality’ 
 
In this section I will seek to elaborate on the above discussed distinction between normal 
and abnormal, in relation to the power dynamics that lead to its establishment and consolidation. 
In doing so, I will rely upon Foucault’s interpretation of power and the relationship between 
power, knowledge and discourse. This discussion will enable me to approach the ambit of 
‘sexual normality’ vs. ‘sexual abnormality’ as a product of the specific distribution of power in 
Serbian society. 
 
Unlike formal approaches that consider discourse in terms of language, text and verbal 
interaction, Foucault thinks of discourses as disciplines (McHoul and Grace, 1993). In Foucault’s 
interpretation the concept of discipline combines and unites two distinct meaning of this term; 
discipline – as a body of knowledge, and discipline – as a form of social control (Ibid). Clearly, 
this interpretation emphasizes the inseparability of discourses and the power relations within 
which they function. For Foucault, the notion of power extends far beyond the limits of the state 
and its institutions. To think about power in terms of the state would mean to reduce it to the 
concept of sovereignty and, ultimately, to the concept of law, as well as to grasp it as essentially 
repressive, i.e. limited to the prohibition functions (Foucault, 1991a). While acknowledging the 
importance of the state, as a superstructural power, Foucault argues that the state is far from 
being able to cover the whole field of power networks that invest ‘body, sexuality, the family, 
kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth’ (Ibid, p.64). 
 
For Foucault, the notions of truth and knowledge are inseparable from the notion of 
power; power creates knowledge and, at the same time, draws its authority by referring to 
scientific truths.  
 
We should admit, rather, that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging 
it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relation. [Foucault, 1991b: 27] 
 
In Foucault’s view, ‘truth’ does not signify something that is to be ‘discovered and 
accepted’ (Foucult, 1991a: 74), but rather a set of rules and procedures, created through the 
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mechanisms of power, and according to which the true and false are separated (Ibid). In that 
sense, power establishes the dividing line between normal and abnormal – a crucial division in 
the process of life administration that is the major concern of all forms of government (McHoul 
and Grace, 1993). Further, Foucault points out that the modern exercise of power is, contrary to 
the traditional one, more dependent upon human bodies than upon the earth and commodities 
(Ibid). Thus, sexuality – as the field that links human body as biological organism and population 
as a social body – becomes the issue of an exceptional importance, as well as the area that 
requires a strict regulation of normality and abnormality. In the first volume of ‘The History of 
Sexuality’, Foucault (1990) challenges the so-called ‘repressive hypothesis’ according to which 
the bourgeois society, through its power/knowledge mechanisms, repressed human sexuality and 
consigned it to a shadow existence. He claims that, on the contrary, modern society has incited a 
proliferation and multiplication of discourses on sex and, in that way, has established sexuality as 
an important feature of personal identity. Nevertheless, a firm boundary between heterosexual 
monogamist sex, on the one side, and sexual acts ‘contrary to nature’, on the other, has remained 
crucial and untouched (Ibid, p.38). In that way, power has defined normality and established the 
procedures for the production of truth. 
 
2.3. Hate Speech 
 
Freedom of speech1, as a philosophical idea and political reality, has been occupying the 
attention of thinkers and scholars since ancient times (Gearon, 2006). Each historical era has 
defined the scope of freedom of speech; however, it is only in the modern period that liberty to 
express ideas, opinions and beliefs has become established as a right (Ibid). Today freedom of 
expression is guaranteed by all major international, regional and national legal instruments. As 
stated in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers’. Freedom of expression is crucial for the functioning of democracy and 
public participation in political processes. Its principal aim is to protect individuals and society 
                                                          
1 In this thesis, the terms ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘freedom of expression’ will be used interchangeably. 
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as a whole from political oppression and authoritarian government. However, as Mahoney 
(1994) argues, ascribing an absolute value to freedom of speech, and neglecting the potential 
clashes between this freedom and other human rights, is essentially wrong. In other words, she 
points out that freedom of speech has to be balanced with other important values, such as human 
dignity and non-discrimination (Ibid). Nevertheless, there is no universal agreement on the need 
for limiting freedom of speech, or on the scope of the potential limitations. This section will 
provide a short overview of different theoretical positions, as well as different legal solutions, in 
regards to freedom of expression and hate speech as its limitation. 
 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides one of the most liberal 
legal frameworks for expressing opinions and beliefs. It prohibits Congress from passing any law 
that would infringe, inter alia, freedom of speech and of the press. The First Amendment – as a 
product of the American Revolution – is deeply imbued with the spirit of libertarianism and 
enlightenment that challenged the authoritarian rule of monarchs and the church, and celebrated 
reason and individual liberty. Hence, American legal settings allow individuals and organisations 
great freedom in expressing all kinds of views, among others those that could be perceived as 
offensive or harmful. One of the most prominent classical defences of freedom of speech is given 
by J.S. Mill in his famous work ‘On Liberty’ in which the author argues that government has no 
right to ‘prescribe opinions to its citizens, and to determine what doctrines or what arguments 
they shall be allowed to hear’ (Mill, cited in Gearon, 2006: 82). On the other hand, Mill 
introduces the so-called harm principle, according to which people have the right to do anything 
they like, but only as long as it does not cause harm to the rights of others. However, the notion 
of harm itself has been subject to various interpretations and, consequently, it does not provide a 
solid base for determining the scope of freedom of expression.  
 
Mill’s liberal views have influenced a number of 20th century authors, primarily those 
coming from the American political culture – strongly marked by the spirit of the First 
Amendment. For instance, Noam Chomsky (1980), in his defence of French academic Robert 
Faurisson who was prosecuted and fined for Holocaust denial, argues that a genuine support for 
free speech implies the support for free expression of the views one disagrees with. He states: 
‘[i]t is a truism, hardly deserving discussion, that the defence of the right of free expression is not 
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restricted to ideas one approves of, and that it is precisely in the case of ideas found most 
offensive that these rights must be most vigorously defended’ (Chomsky, 1980). It appears that 
Chomsky in this article approaches freedom of speech as a value per se, detached and entirely 
independent from the actual content of speech. Thus, by employing a formalist approach, he 
neglects the fact that the field of human rights and social sciences, in general, could hardly be 
seen as a content-neutral field of research. Further, by pointing out that freedom of speech ought 
not to be dependent on individual preference and taste, Chomsky fails to acknowledge that there 
are values – such as human dignity – that go beyond the question of individual preference, and 
that deserve universal respect.  
  
Referring to Mill’s defence of the freedom of speech, Bracken (1994) argues that Mill did 
not advocate absolute freedom. He reminds us of the above mentioned harm principle, pointing 
out that it ‘[allows] “offensive speech” up to the point that it becomes a nuisance to someone’ 
(Ibid, p.12; emphasis in the original). Bracken suggests that Mill actually wanted to make 
distinction between ‘speech as “incitement” and speech as mere “advocacy”’ (Ibid). In a similar 
fashion, he develops an argument based on the premises of Cartesian dualism – a philosophical 
position that sees the human mind as entirely separated from the corporeal body. Cartesian 
dualism, therefore, implies unrestricted freedom of will, as well as the so called ‘mental privacy’, 
i.e. the impossibility of scrutinising someone’s mind, or modelling someone’s will.  
 
We are completely free to act, or not to act, on the basis of what we hear or read. 
Language does not, as it were, coerce us. If we are persuaded by what we hear, that is our 
own choice. [Bracken, 1994: 8; emphasis in the original] 
 
Thus, Cartesian dualist framework – by separating body and mind – also provides a categorical 
distinction between speech and action. Drawing upon the radical free-will theory, and pointing 
out that every person is responsible for their own actions, Bracken concludes that words are not, 
and ought not to be treated as deeds.  
 
However, as stated in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, freedom of expression carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities and, therefore, may be subject to the restrictions that are 
necessary: ‘(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national 
security or of public order, or of public health or morals’. Further, Article 20 of the same 
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covenant prohibits any propaganda for war, as well as any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred. Nowadays, the great majority of jurisdictions, as well as the majority of 
scholars, accept the necessity of certain restrictions on freedom of speech. Hate speech, as one of 
the restrictions, has been widely debated and scrutinised in both political and academic circles, 
but a universally agreed definition of hate speech does not exist. Nevertheless, there are two 
elements that appear to be common to a variety of views; first, hate speech is directed to a person 
or a group of persons who are considered by some to be inferior on the basis of some 
characteristic that is constitutive to their identity and, generally, innate (e.g. race, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation etc.); secondly, hate speech is intended to incite violence, discriminatory 
treatment, or the offence to human dignity of targeted  person(s) (See, for example: Cortese, 
2006; Heyman, 2008; Gelber, 2002).2  
 
Katharine Gelber (2002), for example, is primarily concerned with searching for an 
adequate response to hate speech, rather than with elaborating on its definition. In developing her 
argumentation, Gelber combines three theories; Nussbaum’s capabilities theory, Austin’s 
conception of utterances as ‘speech-acts’, and Habermas’s validity claims model. Gelber starts 
the discussion about hate speech by challenging the libertarian conception of free speech 
according to which the goal of a speech policy is simply to minimise the restraints on 
individuals’ speech liberty. Drawing upon Nussbaum’s idea that free speech is important to the 
development of human capabilities3, she offers an alternative conception that emphasises the 
participation in the free speech exercise as the primary goal of a well-designed speech policy 
(Gelber, 2002; emphasis added). Gelber also challenges the above discussed distinction between 
‘doing’ and ‘saying’, by referring to Austin’s concept of speech-acts. 
 
From Austin, I have utilised the idea that when a person speaks, they are doing more than 
making a statement. They are acting through the discursive utterance, with force and 
meaning as an act. [Ibid, p.9] 
 
Thus, by arguing that every speech is indeed a specific form of action, Gelber affirms Austin’s 
view that any distinction between ‘doing’ and ‘saying’ is theoretically useless and practically 
                                                          
2 See also: Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK); Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK); The 
German penal code; Gayssot Act 1990 (France). 
3 According to Nussbaum (cited in Gelber, 2002: 41), capabilities represent means by which individuals make 
choices as to how to function within different social spheres. 
19 
 
fallacious. Finally, Gelber draws upon Habermas’s validity claims model in order to demonstrate 
the force of hate speech. In Habermas’s theory of communicative action, validity claims are 
claims raised by speakers, and they represent ‘the rules by which the agreement could be reached 
on the meaning of the communication’ (Ibid, p. 61). In every utterance three validity claims are 
simultaneously raised: the claim to truth, the claim to rightness of norms and values, and the 
claim to the speaker’s sincerity. In hate speech, these three validity claims appear as the claim to 
inequality in the objective world, the claim to the rightness of discrimination against certain 
groups, and the claim of a sincere hater towards the targeted group (Ibid). Pointing out the 
‘systematic power asymmetry’ in the favour of the hate-speaker (Ibid, p. 87), Gelber concludes 
that a hate-speech-act is a discursive act of discrimination that propagates and perpetuates 
inequalities.   
 
Zingo (1998), on the other hand, focuses particularly on the hate speech against LGBT 
people, who she describes as ‘sex/gender outsiders’. In Zingo’s interpretation, the meaning of the 
term ‘outsider’ coincides with Mosse’s notion of countertype/outsider, that is, it signifies all 
those who are perceived by the ‘healthy’ majority as abnormal and deviant. Accordingly, Zingo 
points out that the discrimination against LGBT people has less to do with their gender identity 
or sexual orientation – as such, then with the belief that they represent a threat to the rigid 
boundary between sexual normality and abnormality and, consequently, to the decency and 
respectability of the heterosexual lifestyle. Thus, sex/gender outsiders are seen, indeed, as 
undermining the privileged status of heterosexuality (Ibid, p.5). Further, regarding hate speech, 
Zingo refers to the legal practice of the USA Supreme Court, and discusses two different tests 
employed in the freedom of expression cases. The first one is the ‘clear and present danger’ test 
according to which the government is allowed to limit freedom of expression only in cases when 
speech represents an immediate danger of substantive evil, e.g. the danger of riots or any other 
king of violence (Ibid, p.18). The second test – the ‘bad tendency’ test – no longer requires 
danger to be imminent. The government is permitted to set limitations on free speech ‘if its 
natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil’ (Gitlow v. New 
York, 1925; cited in Zingo, 1998: 18, emphasis in the original). Hence, the focus was shifted 
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This chapter will outline the features of the current Serbian politics that render it pro-
nationalist. Further, it will also provide a short overview of the Serbian anti-discrimination and 
hate speech laws, and briefly discuss the dominant perceptions of gender roles in contemporary 
Serbia. My aim here is to demonstrate that, despite a solid legal framework for the protection of 
LGBT rights, Serbian society is still deeply patriarchal and hostile to sexual minorities.  
 
 
3.1. Serbian Politics and Nationalist Myths 
 
Serbian politics during the last decade of the 20th century were marked by the aggressive 
nationalism of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and the involvement of Serbia in the armed 
conflicts that engulfed the Western Balkans after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The origin of 
the wars in the Former Yugoslavia can be located in the antidemocratic reaction of the Serbian 
elite to pressures for reform and, more specifically, in the resurgence of Serbian nationalism that 
eventually led to mass atrocities in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo (Kent, 2006). In terms of 
methods and forms of organisation used by the Milošević regime – including mass media 
campaigns, mass political rallies, regular army and police units supported by paramilitary 
squads, etc. – Serbian nationalism during the 1990s could be described as a form of fascism 
(Ibid). Today, although the wars are a decade ago, the ghost of the nationalist past is very much 
present in Serbian society. Almost eleven years after the fall of the authoritarian regime of 
Slobodan Milošević, Serbia is still struggling to define its political orientation and alignment. 
Heavily burdened by the legacy of the 1990s, as well as with the unfavourable economic 
circumstances, the Serbian Government is balancing between the commitment to EU 
integrations, on the one hand, and pro-nationalist politics, on the other. In 2009, faced with the 
country’s economic collapse and the global crisis, the Government adopted a series of legislative 
and policy measures that were a step forward in the process of European integrations (Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2010: 20). However, at the same time, the anti-European 
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block – encompassing nationalist parties, the Serbian Orthodox Church, various right-wing 
groupings, a part of the scholarly elite, and parts of media – was growing stronger and gaining 
new supporters (Ibid). Thus, despite the declared democratic and pro-European orientation of the 
Government, Serbian society is still deeply imbued with nationalist ideas, most obviously 
expressed in the various political myths that I will discuss below.  
 
One of the most dominant national myths in contemporary Serbia is the Kosovo myth. As 
Gavrilović and Ljubojević (2011) argue, the Kosovo myth is a myth about borders and, at the 
same time, a myth about sacrifice. According to this myth, the Kosovo battle of 1389 between 
the Serbian and Ottoman armies was a sacrifice made by the Serbian people for the benefit of the 
entire Christian civilisation. Hence, the Kosovo myth has established Serbs as ‘the keepers of the 
gates of the civilised world’ (Ibid, p.45). Further, this myth has enforced the belief that Serbs 
have never been rightfully rewarded for the sacrifice they made in 1389. Consequently, as 
Gavrilović and Ljubojević point out ‘[…] Serbs harboured a growing feeling of injustice and 
bitterness towards the West, while the nationalists once again found themselves inspired by 
topics form ancient history’ (Ibid, p.46; see also: Biserko, 2008). Three years after the 
declaration of Kosovo independence, the great majority of Serbian political actors, including the 
ruling Democratic Party, still refuse to accept it, and commonly refer to it as to the violation of 
Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, the Kosovo myth has not lost its appeal. On 
the contrary, it is nowadays widely used by the Serbian right-wing as a tool of mobilisation 
around the idea of Western conspiracy against Serbia, as well as the idea of superiority and the 
great merit of the Serbian nation. 
 
Captivated by the myths about the heroic past, and determined to persist in denying 
Kosovo independence, Serbian political establishment needed an ally. With the rise of the EU 
and Russia’s willing distance from the West (Perica, 2011), it seems as an inevitable 
consequence that the ally was found in the government of the Russian Federation. According to 
Perica (2011), this Serbo-Russian post-communist ‘romance’ signifies a revival of the once 
powerful pan-Slavic myth, the myth about the common descent of all Slavonic peoples 
encompassing the idea of the pan-Slavic kingdom. However, in its new Serbo-Russian version, 
the pan-Slavic myth has been reduced to the idea of pan-Orthodoxy, that is, to the concept of 
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brotherhood of all Orthodox Slavs. This fact highlights a very important feature of the ‘special 
relationship between Serbia and Russia’ (Ibid, p. 37) – it was largely based on religion. 
Consequently, the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church has drastically increased, not only 
in terms of cultural domination, but also in terms of institutional and political significance, as 
well as economic power. Analysing the intertwining of nationalism, state politics and religion in 
Serbia, Drezgić (2010: 956) points out that the ‘instrumental pious nationalism’ of the 1990s was 
replaced by a model of ‘religious nationalism’ after 2000, in which the connections between the 
Church and the centres of political power have become much tighter. Thus, imitating the Russian 
model, Orthodox Christianity was basically made the state religion (Perica, 2011), and the 
secularity of Serbian politics has become highly questionable in numerous instances, some of 
which will be discussed in the next sections.  
 
The myth that substantially builds on the Kosovo myth is the myth about Serbs as a 
warrior nation. The recent ethno-nationalist conflict in the former Yugoslavia has only fuelled 
the belief that the constant war is Serbian destiny, while the subsequent ICTY trials strengthened 
the perception of the accused political leaders as war heroes and great martyrs (Ljubojević, 2010; 
see also: Perica and Gavrilović, 2011). As Ljubojević (2010: 2) argues, ‘The “swan song” of 
once active national leaders, later ICTY detainees, is incentivizing new forms of nationalism 
practiced by young generations that never experienced the war.’ Thus, in the absence of a ‘real’, 
war enemy, the new generations – inspired by warrior myths and eager to affirm their patriotism 
– started looking for the enemies of the nation in all those who do not conform to their 
perception of normality. 
 
3.2. The Prohibition of Discrimination and Hate Speech – Legal 
Framework for LGBT rights 
 
Serbia is a party to the ICCPR of which articles 2 and 26 affirm the right to equal 
treatment and equal protection before the law, without any discrimination. Serbia is also a party 
to the ECHR, and was among the first countries to ratify Protocol 12 to this convention, which 
has strengthened the non-discrimination clause enshrined in Article 14 of ECHR. Further, Article 
21 of the Serbian Constitution guarantees equality before the law and prohibits all kinds of 
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discrimination. Although the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation and gender identity, the list of prohibited grounds in Article 21 is left 
‘open’.  
 
After years of preparation, in March 2009, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
proposed the draft of the first comprehensive anti-discrimination law in Serbia. Nevertheless, the 
draft was withdrawn from the parliamentary procedure because of the objection by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and other religious denominations to several of its provisions – among others, 
the one barring discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The withdrawal 
of the law sparked strong criticism by numerous national and international human rights NGOs. 
Due to the fact that the adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law was a necessary 
condition for further advancement in European integrations, the law was finally adopted – 
however, not without changes to the disputed provisions. Thus, gender identity, as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination, was omitted from the disputed article 21 of the Anti-Discrimination 
Law, with a highly controversial explanation that gender identity is covered by the notion of sex 
(Alo!, 2009). Hence, the Article 21 has been adopted as following: 
 
 
Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
Sexual orientation shall be a private matter, and no one may be called to publicly declare 
his/her sexual orientation. 
Everyone shall have the right to declare his/her sexual orientation, and discriminatory 
treatment on account of such a declaration shall be forbidden.  
 
[National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2009; unofficial translation by UNDP 
Serbia] 
 
Regarding hate speech regulations, Article 49 of the Serbian Constitution prohibits ‘any 
inciting of racial, ethnic, religious or other inequality or hatred’ (National Assembly of the 
Republic of Serbia, 2006). Further, Article 386 of the Criminal Code establishes that the 
violations of human rights based on racial and other discrimination are criminal offences. 
Finally, according to the Public Information Law (Article 38; my translation), 
 
[i]t is prohibited to publish ideas, information and opinions that incite discrimination, 
hatred or violence against a person or a group of persons on the basis of their belonging 
or not belonging to a certain race, religion, nation, ethnic group, gender, or on the basis of 
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their sexual orientation, regardless of whether the publication at stake constitutes a 
criminal offence or not. 
 
[National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2009] 
 
Hence, Serbia clearly belongs to the group of countries that have thoroughly regulated 
hate speech. Nevertheless, hate messages in public narratives are frequent, and the chances that 
the offenders will be prosecuted are minor (See, for example: YUCOM, 2008; Logar, 2011). 
Targets of hate speech in Serbia are numerous; they are usually individuals and groups that, 
according to some criteria, belong to the category of ‘outsiders’. Sexual minorities are amongst 
these.  
 
3.3. Gender Order and Homophobia in Serbia 
 
Serbian society, as an unstable transitional democracy balancing between the so called 
‘Europeanisation’ and pro-nationalist politics, is still a male dominated society, patriarchal, 
traditional and conservative regarding gender order. Drezgić (2010), for example, argues that the 
persistence of patriarchal values in Serbia is, in a large part, a consequence of what she calls 
‘religious nationalism’, this is, the system characterised by symbiotic relationship between 
political institutions and the church. Acknowledging that religion does not necessarily have to be 
oppressive towards women, Drezgić points out that Orthodox Christianity, like other 
monotheistic religions, promotes a strict division between gender roles, in which the public 
realm is reserved for men and private for women. Similarly, Papić (1994) argues that the 
patriarchal system of values in Serbian society has been driven by a particularly militant type of 
nationalism that glorified men as warriors and heroes, while putting women into the submissive 
role of mothers and wives. On the other hand, Simić (1983) claims that there are some relatively 
unique gender/power structures characteristic of Yugoslav societies. He rejects the commonly 
presumed opposition between patriarchy and matriarchy as mutually exclusive categories, and 
argues that there are two levels of power and authority in the societies of South Slavs. The first – 
general societal level – is characterised by male dominance and machismo, while the other – 
family level – is dominated by older women. Nevertheless, as Simić argues, the women of 
authority are seen as semi-sacred and entirely deprived of sexuality. Hence, in relation to 
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sexuality, the strict division between genders remains intact, and no space is left for alternating 
traditional gender roles.  
 
Although same-sex sexual activity is legal in Serbia since 1994, the Serbian society is 
still deeply homophobic, and alternative sexual orientations are socially unacceptable and treated 
like degeneration and sickness (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2010: 2). The 
attitude of Serbian society towards homosexuality is best illustrated by the research carried out in 
2010 by one of the Serbian LGBT organisations, the Gay Straight Alliance, in cooperation with 
the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. According to this research, 67% of the 
respondents believe that homosexuality is an illness, while 53% think that the government 
should take measures to combat homosexuality. Further, 56% of the respondents see 
homosexuality as very dangerous to society, while 64% support the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
its condemnation of LGBT people. Only 15% of respondents believe that the LGBT people in 
Serbia are a vulnerable group, and only 12% think of Gay Pride Parades as legitimate means for 
advancing the rights of sexual minorities. As a consequence of such a high level of homophobia, 
LGBT people in Serbia live in isolation, social exclusion, fear, and in a situation in which guilt 
and shame are constantly imposed on them (Kurepa, 2010). Moreover, sexual minorities are 
exposed to all forms of violence, ranging from psychological and verbal violence, such as 
rejection by family and friends, institutional violence in the form of expulsion from work, 
harassment by superiors, etc., to condemnations, threats and intimidation finally resulting in 















This research uses discourse analysis as the main methodological and analytical tool. As 
Fairclough (2001) argues, discourse analysis is not only a method in social scientific research, 
but also a theoretical perspective that treats language as an element of material social processes. 
This analytical approach is based on the assumption that social reality is constructed through 
discourses – actual practises of talking and writing – and, as such, cannot be fully understand 
without a reference to discourses (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). Accordingly, Phillips and Hardy 
(2002: 6) define discourse analysis as: 
 
[a method] that tries to explore how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate 
the world were created in the first place and how they are maintained and held in place 
over time. Whereas other qualitative methodologies work to understand or interpret social 
reality as it exists, discourse analysis endeavours to uncover the way in which it is 
produced.  
 
Although the discourse analysis is an approach to language as a form of communication, 
the concept of discourse cannot be reduced to the concept of language. In other words, discourse 
is not only a tool for gaining an insight into social reality – it is a constitutive part of that reality 
and, as such, a subject of the analysis itself (Bryman 2008: 499-501).  
 
In this study I used discourse analysis to examine the Serbian public discourse related to 
the subjects of homosexuality and LGBT rights. Namely, I have analysed a certain number of 
public debates, media reports, statements and discussions that emerged around the issues related 
to sexual minorities. As a particular discourse is inevitably related to a certain context (Meyer, 
2009), I strived to link it to a wider discourse of the Serbian right-wing, and to examine how 
homosexuality is portrayed with reference to the Serbian tradition, culture and national myths 
and stereotypes. I believe that this method is the most suitable analytical tool for my research as 
the aim of this study is to uncover how a social reality – i.e. prejudices and discrimination 
against the LGBT minority in Serbian society – is created through certain discursive practices. 
Further, this thesis focuses on the discourse of the power-holders in the Serbian society, namely: 
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the political elite, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the mainstream media. In that sense, it uses 
critical discourse analysis (CDA), a variant of discourse analysis that places emphasis on the role 
of language as a power resource (Bryman, 2008). Van Dijk (1996: 84, cited in Phillips and 
Hardy, 2002: 25) defines critical discourses analysis as ‘[a method] that describes and explains 
how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimated by the talk and text of dominant groups 
and institutions’. Therefore, this methodological approach enabled me to establish and analyse 
the correlation between human rights abuses, on the one hand, and discursive practices of 
powerful groups, on the other, as well as to approach their language as a specific ideological 
tool. 
 
In an attempt to accomplish the research objectives outlined in the introductory chapter of 
this thesis, I have used a variety of sources. These sources represent secondary data, which I 
have drawn from newspaper articles, on-line news coverage, organisational websites and NGO 
reports and publications. In regards to the on-line materials that I have used in my research, 
Livingston (cited in Bryman 2008:130) argues that electronic communication could be used for 
research if: ‘the information is publically archived and readily available; no password is required 
to access the information; the material is not sensitive in nature; no stated site policy prohibits 
the use of the material.’ Hence, I made sure that these requirements were fulfilled.  
 
One of the major data collection issues in discourse analysis is the problem of choosing 
between texts (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 72). As I used a variety of different sources of data, I 
strived to overcome this issue by limiting my research to a specific time period and by focusing 
it primarily on the discourses that emerged around three main events: 
 
1) the adoption of the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination (henceforth: the anti-
discrimination law) in March 2009;  
2) the cancellation of the Belgrade Pride in September 2009; and finally, 
3) the Pride parade held in Belgrade in October 2010.  
 
Furthermore, in the analysis of the media discourse, I focused only on print media, as it is 




4.1. Ethical Considerations  
 
As Meyer (2009) argues, in critical discourse analysis researchers generally take an a 
priori moral stand and sometimes cross the line between scientific research and advocacy for 
groups that suffer from social discrimination. In his opinion, such behaviour is fairly expected 
since CDA is an explicitly critical approach that endeavours to uncover the nature of commonly 
hidden power relations. However, some other scholars, for example Widdowson (cited in Mayer, 
2009), argue that CDA is actually a biased ideological interpretation rather than an analysis. He 
points out that CDA is ‘prejudiced on the basis of some ideological commitment, and then it 
selects for analysis such texts as will support the preferred interpretation’ (Widdowson, cited in 
Mayer, 2009:17). Nevertheless, it is important not to forget that the field of human rights cannot 
be seen as a value-free or value-neutral field of research. As Mayer (2009: 17) argues, the 
possibility of gaining an insight into social processes from purely empirical data, without using 
any ‘preframed categories of experience’ is highly questionable. More specifically, he suggests 
that value judgments in the process of the selection of research objects and theoretical 
perspective are generally permitted, while there is no room for them in the context of the 
justification of certain views. As a social sciences student, I have already adopted certain set of 
principles and moral assumptions that frame my research and directly or indirectly affect my 
thinking about the subject I have chosen to focus on. However, through a continuous process of 
learning and critical thinking, I expect to overcome the obstacles that could prevent me from 







































This chapter is organised in three sub-chapters that analyse the discourse of the Serbian 
political establishment, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian mainstream media 
respectively. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the correlation between homophobia and 
Serbian nationalism, as well as to assess the responsibility of certain actors for inciting hatred 
and violence against the LGBT minority.  
 
 
5.1. The Discourse of the Serbian Political Parties 
 
Despite the growing consensus on the necessity of the European integration of Serbia, 
Serbian political parties are still deeply immersed in the nationalist myths briefly discussed in the 
previous chapter. In the following section I will argue that homophobia is a characteristic not 
only of the few parties with openly anti-Western agendas, but of the great majority of actors in 
the Serbian political arena. In my analysis I will focus primarily on the narratives of the parties 
that were explicitly against the anti-discrimination law adopted in March 2009, the most of 
which were (and still are) in the opposition. However, I will also seek to identify subtle forms of 
homophobia that permeate the discourse of certain politicians from the ruling coalition and, 
therefore, open the door for more explicit anti-gay messages. It is important to note that my 
intention here is not to scrutinise the individual political parties and their agendas, but to 
demonstrate the general level of homophobia in the discourse of Serbian politics, as well as the 
correlation between homophobic and pro-nationalist attitudes.  
 
During the parliamentary debate on the anti-discrimination law in March 2009, its most 
vocal opponents were not only the opposition parties, but also one of the parties from the ruling 
coalition – the party called United Serbia. United Serbia is a right-wing populist party relying 
heavily on the charisma of its president Dragan Marković Palma, who, in his public appearances, 
never misses the opportunity to highlight his commitment to the traditional Serbian values. 
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Explaining the reasons for being against the adoption of the abovementioned law, he pointed out: 
‘I have nothing against homosexuals, but I will never vote for something that is sick’ (Danas, 
2009; my translation). He also stated that he ‘could not stand’ gays, and that he was disgusted by 
their effeminate appearance (Jevremović, 2009; my translation). Further, a representative of the 
biggest opposition party – Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) – made the following statement: 
‘The affirmation and promotion of the so-called “personal preferences” under the slogan of 
equality and freedom is not acceptable. This will, undoubtedly, lead to a situation in which 
sodomy and paedophilia will be protected as personal preferences.’ (Večernje Novosti, 2009a; 
my translation). A senior official of the right-wing Serbian Radical Party (SRS), whose leader is 
currently on trial before the ICTY, also compared homosexuality with paedophilia, stressing that 
the law that prohibits discrimination against LGBT people would eventually open the door for 
legalising paedophilia. He also pointed out that the anti-discrimination law was imposed on the 
Serbian Government by the powerful Western states, and was aimed at destroying the Serbian 
nation (Ibid). Finally, the conservative and pro-Christian Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) 
argued – as well as all the abovementioned political parties – that the law was not acceptable as it 
did not get the approval of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Ibid).  
 
The above attitudes demonstrate several features of the discourse of the Serbian political 
parties related to LGBT rights and homosexuality. First, all the statements, apart from the last 
one, explicitly establish homosexuality as an illness.4 While the statement of the United Serbia’s 
leader mostly emphasises the fact that all homosexuals are effeminate and, thus, abnormal and 
degenerate, the statements of the representatives of SNS and SRS go even further and, by 
comparing homosexuality with paedophilia, suggest that it is not only a mental illness, but also a 
crime. This attitude correlates with the Nazi views on homosexuality, that Micheler (2005) 
analyses in his article, pointing out that in the Third Reich gay men were seen as corrupters and 
seducers of the youth, representing, therefore, a serious threat to the nation. Secondly, the 
comment of Dragan Marković Palma about the effeminate look of gay people, suggests that all 
homosexuals are effeminate, as well as visibly different from heterosexuals. This statement 
indicates that there is a direct link between physical appearance and personality, establishing, in 
                                                          




that way, homosexuals as the negative stereotype – symbolising everything that the ideal man 
was not (Mosse, 1996). Thirdly, the statement of SRS’s official argues that homosexuality and 
gay rights are a Western product, forcibly imposed to the Serbian nation with the purpose of 
destroying it. Hence, his view clearly implies the existence of the Western conspiracy against 
Serbia. Finally, all the abovementioned political parties believe that Christian values represent 
the parameter for defining what is normal and acceptable and what is not. In other words, they 
see the Serbian Orthodox Church as by default authorised to interfere in legislative process and 
define the notion of normality.  
 
The discourse of the Serbian parties that voted against the adoption of the anti-
discrimination law exemplifies the existence of strong stereotypes (and countertypes) in Serbian 
politics. The stereotype that represents normality is marked by Serbdom, Orthodox Christianity, 
tradition and unalterable gender roles, while the countertype – signifying degeneration – 
encompasses the pro-European orientation, secularism, equality between man and woman and, 
finally, homosexuality and LGBT rights. These stereotypes correspond with the ideal of 
manliness and its antithesis which Mosse analyses in his work. As he argues, although the 
masculine stereotype is not a characteristic of right-wing ideologies alone, it is nationalism that 
links manliness with patriotism, traditional values and religion (Mosse, 1996). Thus, the analysis 
of the stereotypes existing in the Serbian political discourse indicates that homophobia in Serbian 
politics directly correlates to the general right-wing attitudes. Further, examined in Foucauldian 
terms, the stereotypes above also reveal the link between power, discourse and truth, by showing 
how the holders of political power, through their narratives, set the distinction between normality 
and abnormality and establish homosexuality as sickness and degeneration. Finally, drawing 
upon Habermas’s validity claims model utilised by Gelber (2002), I will seek to demonstrate that 
the statements of the abovementioned political parties represent hate speech. First, these 
statements establish the distinction between heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals as an objective 
inequality; secondly, by defining homosexuality as a sickness and moral degeneration, they 
suggest the inferiority of homosexuals and the rightness of the discrimination against them; and 
thirdly, by appealing to Christian morality, traditional values and the alleged threats to the 
nation, they emerge as a specific claim to the sincerity of the hatred towards the LGBT people. 
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Taking into account the power asymmetry between Serbian politicians and the LGBT minority, it 
could be concluded that the above analysed statements represent hate speech.  
 
During the preparations for the Belgrade Pride Parade (henceforth: the Pride, or the 
Parade) that was scheduled for September 2009, the opposition parties, as well as the United 
Serbia, kept the same attitude towards homosexuality, arguing that the Pride would be a public 
demonstration of sickness and abnormality. The members of the ruling coalition, on the other 
hand, pointed out that the LGBT community does have right to hold the Pride Parade; however, 
none of the Government officials explicitly supported the Pride, claiming that they have already 
demonstrated their attitude by voting in favour of the anti-discrimination law adopted in March 
that year (Kurepa, 2010). One of the most vocal opponents of the Pride coming from the ruling 
coalition was Dragan Đilas, the mayor of the Serbia’s capital Belgrade in which the Parade was 
supposed to take place. Đilas stated that he, personally, was against the Pride Parade (Simonović, 
2009), arguing that sexual orientation is an exclusively private matter and, thus, there is no 
reason for disclosing it (Dežulović, 2009). On the other hand, he also stated that he was against 
violence of any kind, condemning on that occasion the far-right organizations who threatened to 
attack the marchers and pointing out that their threats adversely affected the image of the city of 
Belgrade (Ibid). The fact that Đilas condemned the violence against the marchers, and did not 
explicitly define LGBT people as morally or in any other way inferior, suggests that he was only 
practicing the freedom to publicly express his views. From this reason, his statements could 
hardly be defined as hate speech. Nevertheless, I will argue that the comments of the Belgrade 
mayor are indeed deeply homophobic, and that they indicate a lack of understanding of the basic 
human rights principles set forth by the major international conventions and affirmed by the 
Serbian laws. First of all, Đilas failed to recognise that the Pride was intended to be a political 
protest against discrimination, rather than a mere demonstration of sexuality. By stating that 
there is no need for such an event, he implied that the discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity is either irrelevant or non-existent. Further, the wording that Đilas 
used, as well as the sequence of statements, suggests that he was equally against the violence, as 
he was against the Pride itself. Finally, by being more concerned about the image of the city than 
the marchers’ lives and security, Đilas demonstrated his disregard for the protection of human 
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rights. Thus, it could be concluded that the views of the Belgrade mayor exemplify a concealed 
hostility against homosexuals and, as such, establish homophobia as a mainstream attitude.  
 
The cancelation of the Belgrade Pride in September 2009 prompted harsh criticism by the 
international community, primarily the EU officials, which, consequently led to a shift in the 
discourse of the Serbian political elite regarding the Pride Parade. When the Serbian LGBT 
activists announced a new attempt to hold the Parade in October 2010, the biggest opposition 
party, SNS, was eager to demonstrate its allegedly pro-European orientation and entirely 
changed attitude towards the LGBT issues. During the meeting with the Pride organisers, a high 
SNS official Aleksandar Vučić pointed out that violence and discrimination against those who 
are different from the majority were unacceptable (Kurepa, 2010). Even SRS – although refusing 
to support the Pride itself – condemned discrimination of any kind (Ibid). The Government 
officials became more explicit in their support to the LGBT minority, and showed stronger 
commitment to securing the Pride 2010 (Ibid). The Belgrade Pride 2010 was finally held, and the 
police managed to prevent the far-right extremists from attacking the marchers, which, in itself, 
represent a step forward. However, the Serbian political discourse is still conspicuously lacking 
an explicit acceptance of LGBT people as non-degenerate and entirely equal with heterosexuals,5 
as well as an unequivocal condemnation of all those opposing their rights. 
 
5.2. The Discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
 
Over the course of the past two decades, Serbian society has gone through a process of 
rapid de-secularisation (Drezgić, 2010; Perica, 2010). Hence, from a society in which the church 
was marginalised and thoroughly subordinated to the state, Serbia has transformed into a society 
with high rates of religious identification (Drezgić, 2010: 956) in which the popularity of the 
dominant church, the Serbian Orthodox Church, has drastically increased. As Drezgić argues, 
throughout modern history, the Serbian Orthodox Church based its authority in the role of a 
national, rather than a religious institution, which in itself indicates its political aspirations. 
Numerous statements made by the Church dignitaries during the 1990s and early 2000s have 
                                                          
5 Again, I am using the term ‘equal’ in the meaning of Article 1 of the UDHR.  
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confirmed this trend. For example, in an interview for the daily Danas, at the beginning of 2001, 
Patriarch Pavle, the recently deceased Serbian Patriarch, stated the following:  
 
The Church, throughout its history, has had to put aside its primary duties and to become 
actively involved in the struggle for the unification of all the Serbs. In that struggle, a 
priest had to be both a teacher and a judge, and also had to take a gun to defend himself 
and his family. [Patriarch Pavle of Serbia, interview for Danas, cited in E-novine, 2010; 
my translation] 
 
Moreover, numerous prelates of the Serbian Orthodox Church have not hesitated to 
publicly demonstrate their hostility towards various groups, such as national and religious 
minorities, atheists, communists, feminists, and many others (E-novine, 2010). Despite the 
constitutional guarantees of secularity, the power of the Church in Serbian society is 
indisputable. Religious views have entered public discourse and created a new reality, i.e. new 
perceptions of social phenomena that Foucault (1991b: 194) refers to as ‘rituals of truth’. 
 
The Serbian Orthodox Church considers that ‘all uses of the human sex organs for 
purposes other than those ordained by creation runs contrary to the nature of things as decreed by 
God, interfering with the normal development of societal patterns’ (Orthodox Statement on 
Homosexuality, cited in Spencer-Dohner, no date; emphasis added). Furthermore, according to 
Orthodox views, there appear to be two types of homosexuality – one representing a medical 
disorder, and the other resulting from a moral failure. In both cases, correction is called for, 
primarily in terms of medical and psychiatric treatment (Ibid). The general attitude of the 
Orthodox Church towards homosexuality, expressed in the above statement, exemplifies the way 
in which a powerful actor, through discursive practice, establishes the notion of normality. In 
Foucault’s view, the notion of normality does not have a universal and unalterable meaning; on 
the contrary, the actual content of this notion varies widely, according to the values of those in 
power. In this particular case, Christianity was taken as the parameter for defining the scope of 
normality and, consequently, all those who do not live in accordance with Christian values were 
left outside the notion of ‘normal’. In that way, the above statement contradicts the right of every 
individual to choose their own religion or to choose not to have religion, and discriminates 
against those of the views different than Christian Orthodox. Furthermore, a particular reference 
was made to the proper use of the human sex organs, i.e. solely for reproductive purposes, which 
reflects the attitude that homosexuals are useless to the nation as they are not likely to reproduce. 
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As Micheler (2005) argues, the insistence on the reproductive function, as a contribution to the 
nation, is typical for far-right regimes and, as history shows, could have tragic consequences. 
Finally, the above statement of the Orthodox Church expressly calls for the intervention in terms 
of hospitalising healthy individuals, advocating, therefore, the violation of a number of human 
rights ranging from the right to equality to the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment.  
 
The general attitude of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards homosexuality has been 
affirmed on numerous occasions, particularly during the past couple of years in which LGBT 
rights in Serbia have become a topic of growing prominence. As already mentioned, in 2009, the 
draft of the first comprehensive anti-discrimination law in Serbia was withdrawn from the 
parliamentary procedure because of the objection by the Serbian Orthodox Church and other 
religious denominations. Although the objections were directed towards more than one provision 
of the respective law, the major stumbling block was Article 21 prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. According to the Serbian daily Blic, the bishop of 
the eparchy of Bačka, Irinej Bulović, called the whole law ‘malignant’ (Blic, 2009; my 
translation), urging the Government to thwart its adoption. The word ‘malignant’ originates from 
medical discourse in which it signifies a severe and potentially fatal illness, usually associated 
with tumours and other medical conditions that tend to produce deterioration. In the discourses 
related to social phenomena, this word could be used to refer to something evil, malevolent, and 
injurious. Clearly, by referring to the anti-discrimination law as ‘malignant’, the bishop 
suggested that the law, if adopted, would promote ‘abnormality’ and moral degeneration. His 
comment condemned homosexuality as a great danger to the society, and implicitly compared it 
with a malignant disease. Furthermore, in its appeal to the president of the Serbian Parliament, 
the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church pointed out that ‘there is no 
scientific evidence that sexual orientation is an inborn trait’ further adding that ‘a number of 
eminent scientists deem transsexuality to be a mental disorder’ (Danas, 2009; my translation). 
The appeal also assessed that the affirmation of gender identity and sexual orientation as 
prohibited grounds of discrimination would endanger religious freedom as well as freedom of 
conscience (Ibid). This statement, once again, established homosexuality and transsexuality as 
diseases threatening the societal order, i.e. set of norms and values that Mosse calls ‘bourgeois 
respectability’ and that in the Serbian context has a prominent religious dimension. 
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During the preparations for the Belgrade Pride Parade that was scheduled for September 
2009, the Serbian Orthodox Church was vocal in condemning homosexuality. Metropolitan 
Amfilohije Radović, at the time acting in the capacity of Patriarch, argued that the Pride Parade 
would actually be a ‘parade of shame’, quoting the Serbian popular saying ‘what the mad are 
proud of, ashames the smart’ (Politika, 2009; my translation). Moreover, he called the Pride the 
parade of ‘Sodom and Gomorrah’, further adding that ‘the tree that does not bear fruits is to be 
cut and thrown into fire’ (Bojić, 2009; my translation). The statements of metropolitan 
Amfilohije Radović violated the rights of the LGBT minority in more than one way. First, he 
declared homosexuality a disgrace, which implied that LGBT people – as those unable to resist 
‘shameful impulses’ – were inferior to those who lived in accordance with the Christian 
morality. Thus, sexual minorities were established as dishonourable, representing what Mosse 
calls a negative stereotype. Secondly, the above statements expressed the view that homosexuals 
were not only mentally ill (‘insane’), but also physically degenerate and barren, as they do not 
use their bodies for the purposes decreed by god (See above: Micheler, 2005). Finally, the ‘tree 
metaphor’ used by metropolitan Amfilohije, represents a rather explicit call for a violent 
intervention, although the Serbian prelates pointed out on several occasions that the Serbian 
Orthodox Church was against violence of any kind. 
 
As none of the prelates that publicly condemned homosexuality and called for the 
cancelation of the Pride in 2009 was prosecuted for either incitement of violence or hate speech, 
the preparations for the new Pride Parade in autumn 2010 were met with the same attitude of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. The Holy Assembly of Bishops (2010), in its official announcement 
before the Pride, stated that the Church was strongly against the Pride, referring on that occasion 
to the LGBT population as to the ‘so-called sexual minorities’ and to their interests as ‘frivolous’ 
(my translation; emphasis added). Furthermore, the announcement argued that Gay Pride Parades 
violate the right to family life and insult the dignity of believers (Ibid). In that way, the Church 
practically denied LGBT people the status of minority, and declared them a threat to the ‘normal’ 
order of things, i.e. the ‘family life’ in accordance with Christian values. One day after the Pride 




Yesterday we watched the stench poisoning and polluting the capital of Serbia, scarier 
than uranium.6 That was the biggest stench of Sodom that the modern civilization raised 
to the pedestal of the deity. You see, the violence of wrongheaded infidels caused more 
violence. Now they are wondering whose fault it was, and they are calling our children 
the hooligans. [Radović, cited in: B92, 2010; my translation] 
  
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović in the above statement equated LGBT people with a 
dangerous weapon and accused them of being responsible for the violence that happened in the 
streets of Belgrade on 10 October 2010. Further, he explicitly linked homosexuality with 
‘modern civilisation’, defining it as something imposed by modernity and invoking, in that way, 
the myth about a Western conspiracy against Serbia.7 Finally, by implying that it is wrong to call 
the attackers of the Parade hooligans, metropolitan Amfilohije openly sided with them, 
providing, therefore, a legitimation for the violence against the LGBT minority. Clearly, the 
above cited statement constitutes hate speech; it is directed to a minority group that is – in the 
speaker’s view – inferior, it offends the human dignity of LGBT people, and its ‘natural 
tendency and probable effect’ (See: Zingo, 1998: 18) is to incite violence and/or discriminatory 
treatment against the targeted group. A couple of months after the Pride, the Serbian Equality 
Protection Commissioner instructed metropolitan Amfilohije Radović to publicly apologize to 
the participants of the Pride for hate speech. However, metropolitan said he ‘had no intention to 
apologize’, confirming once again his views on homosexuality (Balkan Human Rights, 2011). 
Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović has never been indicted for hate speech. The Equality 
Protection Commissioner, shortly after the initial warning, concluded the case by asserting that 
the Government had ‘no capacity’ for initiating the judicial proceeding against Amfilohije 
Radović (Miladinović and Živanović, 2011).  
 
5.3. The Discourse of the Serbian Media 
 
Despite the fact that the above cited Article 38 of the Serbian Public Information Law 
explicitly lists sexual orientation as one of the prohibited basis of hate propaganda, anti-gay 
messages in Serbian media space are still frequent, while the offenders go unpunished. In this 
                                                          
6 Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović was referring to the depleted uranium allegedly used by NATO during the 
military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999.  




section I will analyse the discourse of the Serbian daily newspapers, with the focus on those with 
high circulation that, consequently, achieve considerable political influence and represent the 
mainstream media. In doing so, I will discuss both the media coverage of the three events that I 
am focusing on (i.e. the debate around the adoption of the anti-discrimination law in March 
2009, the cancelation of the Belgrade Pride in September 2009, and the Pride parade held in 
Belgrade in October 2010), and the published opinions of some prominent columnists and 
journalists.  
 
The controversy around the adoption of the anti-discrimination law in March 2009 was 
given a significant space in the Serbian media. While some of the Serbian dailies were explicitly 
advocating for the adoption of the law and condemning its withdrawal from the parliamentary 
procedure, others, more or less openly, supported the views of the Serbian Orthodox Church. For 
instance, Serbian daily Večernje Novosti, the daily which is remembered for its collaboration 
with the regime of Slobodan Milošević, published an interview with the bishop of the eparchy of 
Bačka, Irinej Bulović, with the title ‘The Church is Only Defending Morality’ (Večernje 
Novosti, 2009b, my translation). In a similar manner, daily newspaper Kurir claimed that the 
Government had deceived the Church by returning the law to the parliamentary procedure. 
Under the title ‘Fraud’, Kurir published the following: ‘The Serbian Government deceived the 
dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church, after days of the negotiations on the amendments to 
the anti-discrimination law. At today’s session of the Government, the new draft of the law will 
be adopted, after only cosmetic changes’ (Kurir, 2009a; my translation). Clearly, these media 
texts see the Church’s interference in the legislative process as perfectly acceptable, legitimate 
and ‘normal’. Hence, the discourse of the abovementioned media reflects the processes of the de-
secularisation of Serbian society that Drezgić (2010) and Perica (2011) analyse in their work. As 
Drezgić argues, the relationship between the political institutions and the Church in which, 
during the 1990s, the religion was primarily an instrument of the aggressive nationalist politics, 
has transformed after 2000 into a much tighter relationship in which the Church gained more 
power and influence. Similarly, Perica (2011) points out that, during the government of Vojislav 
Koštunica (2004-2008), the Orthodox Christianity has practically become the state religion, and 
after the elections of 2008 that brought to power current Serbian president Boris Tadić, the 
relationship with the Church has not significantly changed (Ibid). Both Drezgić and Perica 
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illustrate their arguments by pointing to the Church’s various attempts to influence the 
legislation. Thus, although the anti-discrimination law has finally been adopted, the controversy 
that it had provoked confirms the ability of the Serbian Orthodox Church to interfere in the 
matters of state politics and to stall the reform processes. 
 
Politika, the oldest daily in the Balkans, partially owned by the Serbian Government, 
immediately after the adoption of the anti-discrimination law published a column written by 
Slobodan Antonić, a Serbian political analyst who is known for his rightist views. In the column, 
Antonić explicitly supported the Serbian Orthodox Church in its struggle against the 
abovementioned law, suggesting that the Church is a legitimate representative of the great 
majority in the Serbian society (Antonić, 2009). Further, he expressed deep concern about the 
provision prohibiting the discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and its potential 
consequences. Antonić wrote:  
 
In the next step, anti-discrimination will not be enough anymore. They8  will require 
equality. […] After the legal equality is obtained, they will go further and request the 
recognition of social equivalence. […] And in a few years we will be required to 
officially declare homosexuality to have the equal value as heterosexual orientation. [Ibid, 
my translation] 
 
It is clear from the above statement that Antonić considers homosexual orientation to be of less 
worth than heterosexual. Although he did not openly claim that LGBT people are worth less than 
others, his position rather clearly implies that homosexuals could not be equal in rights with 
heterosexuals. Such a view is in a strong opposition with Article 1 of the UDHR that proclaims 
the equality of all human beings and, therefore, as Smith (2007) argues, entails the prohibition of 
discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights. Further, by openly opposing the equal rights of 
all human beings, Antonić implied the following: 1) that the inequality is an objective fact, 2) 
that discrimination against the LGBT minority is legitimate, and 3) that it is justified by the 
superiority of heterosexual over homosexual orientation. Thus, if we analyse Antonić’s column 
within Gelber’s (2002) hate speech theory, it could be concluded that he raised three validity 
claims that, taken together with the position of power that Antonić as a columnist of a 
government-owned daily has (Ibid), qualify his statement as hate speech against LGBT people.  
  
                                                          
8 Referring to LGBT people and the supporters of LGBT rights in general.  
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After the Serbian LGBT activists had announced their plans to hold the Pride Parade in 
September 2009, a number of Serbian media joined the anti-gay campaign that finally led to the 
Pride cancelation. Some dailies, such as Kurir, Press, Alo! and Pravda gave considerable space 
to the right-wing extremists, without any critical review or comment to their views (Labris, 
2010). Referring to the pro-fascist organisations as ‘patriotic groups’, ‘football supporters’ or 
simply ‘youths’ (Ibid), the abovementioned Serbian dailies were continuously publishing their 
hate messages and calls for violence. For example, daily Kurir published the following statement 
of Mladen Obradović,9 leader of ‘Obraz’ – one of the Serbian pro-fascist organisations: ‘A huge 
number of people will come, from all the areas where Serbs live. Our message to faggots is clear: 
We are waiting for you.’ (Kurir; cited in Labris, 2010; my translation). Further, at the time, 
sensational headlines abounded, such as: ‘Gay Parade represents imposing a new ideology on 
Serbia’ (Pravda, 2009; cited in Labris, 2010; my translation) – a headline suggesting that 
homosexuality is an ideology, not just a sexual orientation, forced upon Serbia from outside; 
‘After faggots, sodomist and necrophiliacs will want to parade’ (Alo!, 2009; cited in Labris, 
2010; my translation) – a title that, once again, establishes homosexuality as sickness and 
degeneration; etc. One article published in daily Kurir was particularly indicative. It was entitled 
‘Faggot secedes Kosovo!’ and was about a prominent LGBT activist, Predrag Azdejković, who 
on his blog started an internet campaign called ‘De-Kosovisation of Serbia’ – a satirical critique 
of the Serbian politics related to Kosovo and the stubborn refusal of the Serbian politicians to 
accept the Kosovo independence. Kurir (2009b) called the campaign ‘offensive’ and, as usual, 
referred to homosexual men as ‘faggots’. Two elements of the discourse of the above article 
indicate the connection between homophobic and nationalist attitudes. First, as Gavrilović and 
Ljubojević (2011) argue, the Kosovo myth – that still dominates a large part of the Serbian 
society, including the current Government – suggests that, because of the great sacrifice made by 
the Serbian people in the 14th century, Kosovo will always remain a part of Serbia. Thus, the 
above article, by appealing to the patriotic feelings of the readers, seeks to represent LGBT 
people – particularly human rights activists – as the enemies of the Serbian nation. In Mosse’s 
(1996) view, representing the countertypes – in this case homosexuals – as an active threat to the 
societal order and national unity, is a prominent characteristic of right-wing ideologies. 
                                                          
9 After the Pride 2010, Obradović, well-known for anti-gay hate speech, has finally been arrested and convicted for 
organising riots and violent attacks during the Pride 2010.  
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Secondly, Mosse (Ibid) points out that fascist and nationalist regimes tend to promote the idea 
about the collaborations and plots between the different categories of outsiders. As the ‘loss’ of 
Kosovo is generally associated with the Western conspiracy against Serbia, the above article 
indicates that LGBT people collaborate with Western powers in order to destroy the ‘healthy’ 
Serbian nation.  
 
In a very similar manner, daily Press published an article concerned with the allegations 
that the participants of the Belgrade Pride 2009 will burn the Serbian flag at the beginning of the 
Parade. Regardless of whether the allegation were true or false, it is clear that the intention of the 
above article was to portray the LGBT minority as an enemy of the Serbian state. Moreover, in 
an atmosphere in which the far-right extremist were threating to attack the Pride, this article also 
provides an implicit justification for the violence that was about to occur. As Zingo (1998) 
argues, the limitations to freedom of expression are allowed not only in cases when speech 
represents an immediate danger (the ‘clear and present danger’ test), but also in cases when 
speech is very likely to bring about ‘the substantive evil’ (the ‘bad tendency’ test). Despite the 
fact that the above article passes at least the ‘bad tendency’ test (it could also be argued that it 
passes both tests), no legal action has ever been taken against the daily Press for hate speech. 
 
During the preparations for the Pride 2010, the above discussed Serbian dailies continued 
the anti-gay campaign in a very similar manner as in 2009. After the pride parade was finally 
held – followed by the anti-gay riots – the general attitude prevailing in the discourse of the 
majority of the Serbian media was that the Parade was utterly unnecessary and that the damage 
caused by it 10  was greater than the benefit. Daily Politika, two days after the Pride 2010, 
published a column by political analyst Đorđe Vukadinović (2010), the editor in chief of Serbian 
right-wing quarterly New Serbian Political Thougth (Serbian: Nova Srpska Politička Misao), in 
which he argued that the Parade was forced upon Serbia from the West, contrary to the 
‘historical and political logic’ (Ibid). Therefore, he implied that there is a sharp contrast between 
Serbia and the West, and that the notion of LGBT rights is highly incompatible with Serbian 
history and politics. Further, Vukadinović in his article compared the far-right extremist who 
                                                          
10 Both the material damage caused by the rampage of the extremists, and the ruined image of Serbia provoked by 
the violence in the streets of Belgrade. 
44 
 
intended to attack the Pride participants – just because of their sexual orientation – with the 
participants in the anti-Milošević demonstrations who used violence against the Milošević police 
– primarily as a response to the violence used by the police themselves. Hence, Vukadinović 
suggested that the struggle against an authoritarian regime is essentially the same as the far-right 
violence against minorities. In that way, he implicitly justified the violence that occurred during 
the Belgrade Pride 2010. The article by Đorđe Vukadinović exemplifies a rather dangerous 
relativisation of human rights suggesting that LGBT rights are not universal but entirely 
dependant on political and historical circumstances. Moreover, by practically equating an 
authoritarian regime with the LGBT minority, Vukadinović failed to acknowledge a very 
important difference between those violating human rights, on the one hand, and the victims of 
human rights violations, on the other.  
 
 
This chapter has demonstrated how the discourse of Serbian politicians, the Church and 
the media contribute to the homophobic attitudes in the Serbian society. Despite the legislative 
reform towards the recognition of LGBT rights, stereotypes in the discourses discussed above 
still play an important role in shaping public perceptions of sexual minorities. They consequently 
provide a legitimisation for the discrimination and violence against LGBT persons. The final 














Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
Where there is equality there can be sanity. 
 
George Orwell, ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ (p. 229) 
 
 
6.1. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this thesis has been to analyse homophobia as part of a wider ideological 
constellation of right-wing regimes, as well as to examine the connection between Serbian 
nationalism, on the one hand, and prejudices against LGBT people, on the other. The thesis has 
also addressed the issue of homophobic hate speech as a limitation to freedom of expression. 
Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, the study draws certain conclusions on the role of 
the Serbian public discourse in mainstreaming homophobic attitudes and perpetuating 
discrimination against the LGBT minority.  
 
Homophobia, as a multidimensional phenomenon, could be approached from different 
points of view and examined within a number of disciplines. This thesis analysed homophobia 
from the perspective of human rights – particularly LGBT rights – and strived to identify social 
and political aspects of this phenomenon, namely the right-wing roots of homophobia. At the 
very beginning, the study has shown that the right to equality – as a fundamental human right 
guaranteed by all major international, regional and domestic legal instruments – entails that all 
human beings are entitled to equal protection of the law, and that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity represents a violation of the basic human rights. Further, 
the study has revealed the link between right-wing and homophobic attitudes – established and 
reproduced primarily through the process of stereotyping. As Mosse (1996) argues, all right-
wing ideologies rely heavily on the creation of stereotypes. The masculine stereotype, as one of 
the characteristic features of fascism and nationalism, is defined in contrast with all those who do 
not comply with the standards of manliness and who are, consequently, declared enemies of the 
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nation. Thus, the hatred against countertypes – inter alia homosexuals – is successfully used by 
right-wing regimes as a mobilisation tool and a means of consolidating power. This study has 
also been concerned with the boundary that separates ‘normal’ from ‘abnormal’, and – relying on 
the Foucauldian interpretation of the relationship between power, discourse and truth – has come 
to the conclusion that the notion of normality is not universal, but largely dependent on the 
definition by powerful actors. Hence, the analysis in the previous chapters has shown that there 
is a strong link between homophobia and right-wing ideologies, embodied in stereotypes and 
countertypes, and reproduced through the narratives of power holders. 
 
The second aim of this thesis was to determine whether and how Serbian nationalist 
myths incite homophobia. In that sense, the study has first analysed the elements of the 
contemporary Serbian politics that link it with the recent past and the ethnic conflicts during the 
1990s, namely: the Kosovo myth, the myth about Western conspiracy against Serbia, the pan-
Orthodoxy myth, and the myth about the nation of warriors. The analysis has shown that the 
above myths are still very much alive in contemporary Serbian society and politics. Further, this 
thesis has briefly outlined the legal framework for LGBT rights in Serbia, and has concluded 
that, despite the recent reforms in accordance with the European standards, Serbian society is 
still deeply patriarchal and hostile to sexual minorities. The analysis of the discourses of the 
Serbian politicians, the Church and the media has shown the following: first, the LGBT minority 
is depicted through stereotypes that represent homosexuality as moral and/or physical 
degeneration constituting a threat to the normal societal order and the Serbian nationhood; 
second, the stereotyping of the LGBT minority is strongly supported by the national myths; third, 
as the above stereotypes are characteristic of right-wing ideologies and regimes, it does not 
surprise that homophobia is primarily (although not exclusively) a feature of the pro-nationalist 
Serbian parties and the media with the right-wing political alignment; fourth, hatred against 
LGBT people in Serbian society has a pronounced religious dimension, which is aided by the 
fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church has, over the course of the last two decades, gained a 
considerable political power and influence; lastly, after the cancelation of the Belgrade Pride 
2009, the discourses on homosexuality and LGBT rights have changed towards more tolerance 
and more respect for the rights of sexual minorities, which is primarily a consequence of the 
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political pressure from the EU and the international community in general. Nevertheless, 
homophobia in the Serbian public discourse is still present.  
 
Finally, this thesis also addressed the issue of hate speech, in order to determine if certain 
narratives in the Serbian public arena violate the rights of LGBT persons. Through the 
examination of different theoretical perspectives, the study has argued that some limitations to 
freedom of expression are necessary for the protections of the human rights of others, as well as 
that speech is not only a set of statements but also has the force of an act (Gelber, 2002). In the 
Serbian legal system hate speech is prohibited by several different provisions. Nevertheless, hate 
messages against inter alia LGBT people are frequent and widespread. The inefficiency of the 
Serbian judiciary in prosecution of the offenders indicates that the hate speech laws are not 
adequately implemented. Thus, it could be concluded that some of the reform processes in the 
Serbian society end up in the normative sphere, while the reality remains dominated by the 
myths from the nationalist past.  
 
 
6.2. Recommendations  
 
As indicated above, the gap between the legal obligations and actual practices of the 
Serbian state agencies suggests that the reform processes in Serbia are yet to be completed. 
Despite the adoption of various ‘pro-European’ laws, the effective enforcement of these is still 
lacking. The obstacles in law enforcement represent a complex issue that ought to be addressed 
at both the state level, and within the civil society – particularly in human rights advocacy and in 
academia. In terms of human rights activism, the EU conditionality could be successfully used as 
a means of pressurising the Serbian Government to comply with its legal obligations. At the 
academic level, it would be useful to carefully scrutinise the causes of the insufficient 
implementation of the law – ranging from the lack of political will to the financial constraints 
affecting the Serbian judiciary and law enforcement agencies.  
 
Further, the analysis in the previous chapters has pointed to a rather prominent trend in 
contemporary Serbia – the trend of de-secularisation of the society and an extensive interference 
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of the Serbian Orthodox Church in state affairs. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church has been striving to enhance its influence and to establish itself not only as a 
religious but also as a national institution. As Drezgić (2010) argues, throughout the first decade 
of the 21st century the connections between the Church and the political institutions have become 
even tighter than during the wars in the 1990s. Hence, the secularity of the Serbian state has been 
seriously endangered. In that sense, it is of great importance to set the limits of the Church 
influence. The fact that the secularity of the state is guaranteed by Article 11 of the Serbian 
Constitution indicates that the legal norms, once again, are not adequately implemented. Thus, 
the Government representatives and other politicians are the ones who are primarily responsible 
for preserving the secularity of the Serbian state. In that sense, they – while performing their 
duties – have to remain independent from the Church influences, and to explicitly condemn any 
attempt of the Serbian Orthodox Church to influence legislative and other state affairs.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the topic of this study, changes at the level of 
popular consciousness about LGBT rights – and human rights in general – are needed. As the 
analysis above has shown, the legacy of the nationalist past is still very much alive in 
contemporary Serbia, and the national myths and stereotypes dominate the greatest part of the 
society. Despite the fact that human rights language has gradually entered Serbian public 
discourse, the general awareness of the meaning and the content of human rights is on a rather 
low level. Moreover, because of the prejudices and stereotypes related to homosexuality, 
opposition to LGBT rights is even stronger then to the rights of other minorities. Therefore, 
human rights education – including the education on the rights of sexual minorities – is of crucial 
importance. The term education is used here in the widest sense, encompassing not only formal 
schooling, but also various forms of alternative education. Thus, the responsibility for 
mainstreaming human rights in education should be divided between the Government, NGOs 
and the media. Regarding LGBT rights, education and media policies ought to be based on 
several principles. First, homosexuality (and transsexuality) is not an illness, it is neither illegal 
nor immoral; it is a part of personal identity that is equal in value to heterosexual orientation. 
Secondly, LGBT persons are equal in rights with other individuals and, consequently, 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity represents a violation of 
human rights. Thirdly, homosexuality does not represent a threat to the nation, and does not 
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violate freedom of religion. Thus, religious views and/or patriotic feelings must not be used as a 
justification for the discrimination against LGBT people. Finally, while the EU conditionality 
could be a useful means for pressuring the Government to comply with its legal obligations, in 
education and media, human rights should not be presented as something imported from the 
West and, therefore, culturally alien to Serbian people. On the contrary, it is important to stress 
that the recognition of the equal rights of all individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation or 
any other inborn trait, would benefit Serbian society and all its citizens. In other words, the 
implementation of human rights is not only a prerequisite for the European integrations and a 
nuisance that must be endured for a better future in the EU, but also a prerequisite for societal 
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